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Being Together: Dietrich BonhoefFer
on Human Being
and Theological Ethics
i

Darren E. Dahl
Graduate Student, Lutheran School of Theology
at Chicago

meaningful to speak about existence as ethical at all?
of a Christian ethic? This article
proposes to offer a theological understanding of human being
and doing in order to create a space for theological ethical reflection, discourse and action. Throughout his life as a scholar
and pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrestled with the question of a
Christian ethic and its relation to the life of the church. In our
Is it

If it is,

how does one speak

contemporary milieu of individualism the question of articulating an ethic within the framework of our theological tradition

both challenging and important. It is challenging because
the image of an autonomous, independent, self-creating human
being does not immediately suggest a life lived in responsible
relationships with others. It is important because reflection
upon our life together reveals a profound connection among
humans and with all creation.
Bonhoeffer begins his discourse on ethics from within the
experience of a breakdown of existing possible alternatives:
“One may ask whether there have ever before in human history been people with so little ground under their feet people
to whom every available alternative seemed equally intolerable, repugnant, and futile.” ^ Bonhoeffer refers to what he calls
is
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the “rusty swords”, ^ the ethical alternatives of the past. They
are reason, fanaticism, conscience, duty, absolute freedom and
private virtuousness. ^ In articulating a specifically theological
ethic Bonhoeffer addresses the hidden assumption behind each
of these repugnant alternatives. In other words, to open up
a new space for ethical reflection in the place of these futile
options of the past he must begin with a theological analysis of human being and doing. Through such an investigation
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both the problematic of the old alternatives as well as a new
approach can be investigated.
Theological reflection on human being engages in a polemic
against the Enlightenment understanding of the human as autonomous. Human autonomy means that human beings as
selves understand themselves to be the source of their own exThis notion of autonomy also suggests a self-enclosed
who is independent of the world and the “others”
who coexist in that world. Autonomy carries with it a certain
notion of freedom. Freedom is an innate quality of human being
and, therefore, is the basis of the human as a self-determined
volitional being. Autonomous freedom means that humans are
the source of their own possibilities. Given this notion of autonomy, human identity is constructed through the subject’s
concretized possibilities his or her actions. Who one is is
disclosed through the manner in which one concretizes one’s
freedom. Human autonomy understands “being” to be derivative of doing. My being is achieved through my doing. This is
what it means to be self-constituted. Consequently, theological
reflection on human being has to address the themes of self as
istence.

individual

—

its

own

with

source, the relation of this self to the various “others”

whom

it lives,

and the

relation

between being and doing.

To show the key issues regarding the understanding of human being as autonomous Bonhoeffer turns to the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For Kant reality is understood in terms of two spheres: the phenomenal and the
noumenal. The following quotation from The Critique of Practical Reason expresses this understanding and its relation to

human
A

being:

rational being, as belonging to the sensuous world

nomenal world], recognizes

itself to be, like all

[i.e.,

the phe-

other efficient causes,

necessarily subject to the laws of causality, while in practical matters, in its

other aspect as a being in

itself, it is

conscious of

existence as determinable in an intelligible order of things

noumenal

world].

It is

its

the

conscious of this not by virtue of a partic-

ular intuition of itself but because of certain

determine

[i.e.,

dynamic laws which
it has been suffi-

causality in the world of sense, for

its

ciently proved. .that
.

if

freedom

is

attributed to us,

it

transfers us

into an intelligible order of things. .[This] supersensuous nature of
.

[human beings]
dependent of
the

.

all

autonomy

.

.is

their existence according to laws

which are

in-

empirical conditions and which therefore belong to

of pure reason.^
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Kant’s two-fold understanding of reality is the result of his
conviction that reality is best understood in terms of causality,
Yet, given this starting point, he runs into a problem: strict
causality leaves no room for human freedom. In order that humans do not simply become the pawns of nature and her laws,

Kant develops an understanding

of

freedom and reason that

locates the self in an intelligible (but not directly knowable) su-

persensuous nature. Time, as a form of phenomenal intuition,
does not exist within the noumenal realm. The self within the
noumenal realm is a-temporal and therefore free because it
is outside of the causally conditioned phenomenal world. Freedom is a transcendental quality of the noumenal self. The self
in the noumenal realm is related to the transcendental through
the “moral law” This “moral law” is the legislative form that
reason achieves when an individual maxim is given universal
significance. Kant explains, “[A] rational being either cannot
think of his subjectively practical principles (maxims) as at the
same time universal laws, or he must suppose that their mere
form, through which they are fitted for being given as universal
laws, is alone that which makes them a practical law.”^ The
self is free because it is not conditioned by causality. Therefore,
it “can” do what the moral law prescribes that it “ought” to
do.*^ Its response to this moral law is one of “duty”.^ In considering this it is important to remember that this transcendental
always lies behind cognition and cannot be objectively known.
It can only be assumed as the condition for the possibility of
reason as either pure reason (what Kant understands as speculative reason)^ or practical reason (knowledge of the moral

—

—

.

law).

To

get to the heart of the Kantian understanding of hubeing and doing one must consider the precise nature of
the “transcendental”. Bonhoeffer asks, “[W]hat in fact is this
‘transcendental’ to which everything is supposed to refer? If
it can never be objectively knowable, how can reason deter-

man

own

unknown?

Even if it is to
exercise a free decision of practical reason, the outcome is nevertheless reason’s self-chosen limitation, whereby it reinstates

mine

its

limits against this

—

own authority as the reason which performed this very
limitation.” 11 Thus, in the realm of moral action, if one is in
its

duty obligated to the moral law which one creates by one’s own
power, then one is not obligated to any but the self. The I is its
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own law-giver and its own judge. If Bonhoeffer is correct, and
the transcendental particularly the moral law is only a cover
for the elevated reason of human beings, the result for transcendental philosophy is the human as ultimate reality. Bonhoeffer
continues by asking what it means that the I, who is to understand itself from within itself, can in fact do so. He suggests
that to understand entails creativity. Thus, for the self to understand itself from within itself it has to have created itself in
its understanding. 12 According to Bonhoeffer, this idea is exactly what ends up being asserted as transcendental philosophy
slips toward idealism. By drawing out Kant’s thought to its
extreme conclusion, idealism asserts that “Without I there is
no being; I is creative, the sole efficient; I goes out from itself,
and to itself returns. .[I] dealism pronounces: the world is in
being through me.” 1^ Bonhoeffer concludes, “Thus the essence
of the person is freedom, autonomy, coming-to-itself or beingby-itself.” 14 The picture that Kant and the Idealists paint of
human being is one of individual autonomous freedom. The
contingency of temporality cannot intrude upon my noumenal
being, the claims of the “other” are of no importance in a world
that has come into being through my understanding, and my
destiny lies unrestricted ahead of me in my freedom. As an autonomous self, the I of transcendental and idealist philosophy
is left alone in a timeless world that, through its own reason,

—

—

.

|

;

'

|

it

has created.
In order to suggest an alternative view of

i

human

being
Bonhoeffer turns to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. By
examining Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein as “being-inthe- world” Bonhoeffer raises the issue of temporality and the
relation of the self to its world. Later, by looking at Bonhooffer’s and Heidegger’s understanding of death, the ultimate
limit upon human existence will be considered and a specifically theological articulation of human being will be offered.
In order to counter Kant’s noumenal a-temporality Bonho offer turns to Heidegger for whom “Being is essentially interpreted in terms of temporality.”
Human being is always
already in a world and therefore in time. Bonhoeffer argues
that “we are set objectively in a definite nexus of experiences,
responsibilities and decisions from which we cannot free ourselves again except by abstraction. We live, in fact, within this
nexus, whether or not we are in every respect aware of it.”l^
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The

understood as being outside of the world is a pure
As beings in the world we experience existence
as having a temporal character. That is, we experience past,
present and future as having a constitutive role in our being
human. As we reflect upon our own experience we do not find
ourselves to be timeless. On the contrary, we experience existence as being between the past and the future. The past is
experienced as the “no-longer” and is reflected upon through
memory. The future (adventum) is experienced as the “notyet” that breaks into our existence with the force of negation.
This temporality can be more concretely understood in its relationship to social existence and the understanding of death.
Given the fact that we no longer understand human being
as being alone in a timeless world, the social nature of human existence can be addressed. Because it is in the world,
responsibility
human being as response-able^^— is always a
experience.
Bonhoeffer states that, “At the moment
temporal
when he is addressed the person is responsible, or, in other
words, faced with a decision.. .[and therefore he enters] into the
reality of time by relating [his] concrete person in time in all its
particularities to this obligation, by making [himself] morally
responsible.”!^ Humans experience temporality through their
social life in the world. The contingency of the future is experienced in the “unexpected” claim of the “other” whom I
meet in time. The situation itself where I and Thou meet is
a product of the past becoming present. Through the notion
of temporal sociality another approach to ethical responsibility is being formed that is very different from Kant’s notion
self

abstraction.

—

The

not obligated to itself in its abstract, timeit is obligated to the “other” who makes
a claim upon it in time. Or, in other words, from Kant’s system “...it followed, as the necessary consequence of a one-sided
epistemological philosophy, that the reasoning person had command of his own ethical value, entered by his own strength into
the ethical sphere, and bore his ethical motives within himself,
as a person equipped with mind. The real barrier was not
acknowledged.”!^ This “real barrier” is the other whose claim
upon the self in sociality calls the self out of itself and into the
world of responsibility. Bonhoeffer continues, “. .the individual
cannot be spoken of without the ‘other’ also being thought who
has set the individual in the ethical sphere.” 20 Human being
of duty.

less reason.

I is

Rather

.
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as “being-in- the- world” is called out of itself by its relation to
the “others” who also are in the world. “Sociality” characterizes our existence. Bonhoeffer considers human being from this
social perspective and by examining the activities of thinking,
self-conscious willing and feeling he concludes that “...man’s
entire spirituality is interwoven with sociality, and rests upon
the basic relation of I and Thou. ‘Man’s whole spirituality
becomes evident only along with others: the essence of spirit
is that the self is through being in the other.’ ”21 Human being cannot be understood outside of its relation to others in
its world. Thus, Kant’s lonely noumenal self is shown to be
an abstraction that does not adequately account for the way
humans experience reality.
Until this point Bonhoeffer has argued that human being
is temporal and human being is in the relationship of sociality. The Enlightenment understanding of human being as atemporal and fundamentally alone has been sufficiently challenged. Along with this new understanding of human being as
“being-in- the- world” comes a new understanding of freedom.

Freedom

will have to be freedom in relation. This will be discussed in the final section. So, while Bonhoeffer has appropriated much of Heidegger’s philosophy to suggest this different
proposal he does not accept Heidegger’s thought without criticism. His criticism particularly centers on Heidegger’s understanding of death.
The Kantian and idealist understanding of human being
has within itself glimpses of infinitude because of the I’s role
as self-creator, law giver and self-judge, but this understanding is avoided in Bonhoeffer’s use of Heidegger. Dasein is always already in a world that it did not create. It participates
in this world as a finite, temporal being who, while always
being understood as potentiality, can never be absolute potential because existence is always historical finite existence. 22
Bonhoeffer takes issue with Heidegger, however, precisely in
his understanding of finitude. He writes that for Heidegger
“the philosophical concept of finitude is that of incapsulated
finitude”. 23 This accusation becomes clear as one examines
Heidegger’s understanding of death. Both agree that human
being, as temporal, experiences the future as that which is
“not yet”. Bonhoeffer states, in his introduction to Creation
and Fall, that the church “lives from the end, it thinks from

,
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the end, it acts from the end, [and] it proclaims its message
from the end.” 24 Heidegger writes, “The ‘ahead-of-itself,’ as an
item in the structure of care, tells us unambiguously that in
Dasein there is always something still outstanding which, as
a potentiality-for-Being for Dasein itself, has not yet become
‘actual’. It is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that
However,
there is constantly something still to be settled.
Bonhoeffer and Heidegger differ in the way they understand
^

the experience of death as the final “not yet” of the future.
The problem begins when Heidegger states that “Any Dasein
exists in just such a manner that its ‘not yet’ belongs to it.” 26
The future as “not yet” introduces contingency through negathat is, does
tion. Yet, if the “not yet” belongs to existence
not confront it from outside of itself that contingency has always already been overcome by the enclosed Being of Dasein.
Death is that final “not yet” that is “impending” in that it

—

—

“stands before us”. 27 However, because even this “not yet”
belongs to the becoming28 nature of Dasein, death is understood as a possibility. 29 Dasein, as a “being-towards-death”
experiences death as that which discloses Dasein’s utmost possibility: anticipation of death as a way of seeing Dasein as a
whole. Bonhoeffer summarizes Heidegger’s position:
As temporal Dasein within historicity (Geschichtlichkeit),
itself upon its own final end, in order to attain its

order

wholeness.
is

And

this

end

is

“being-towards-death”.

stands that

it

is

.

it

must

original

death. In the most proper sense Dasein
.[and] in

the

call of

conscience

it

under-

guilty in its gravitation to the world, its futility,

and enters into the

possibility

most proper to

it

—commitment to

death. 69

Bonhoeffer and Heidegger share a

common

beginning in

their understanding of death. Dasein, as temporal, experiences

the future and, therefore, experiences the “not yet” of existence
as that which stands before it. For both thinkers death is dis-

However, death discloses something different for each.
Because Heidegger works out of what Bonhoeffer calls an “incapsulated finitude” death can only disclose possibilities that
lie within existence as it is experienced between “birth and
death” .61 That is, because death is the final “not yet” which
closive.

nevertheless belongs to the ontological-existential structure of
existence, the possibilities it can disclose do not go beyond the
limits of the existence of Dasein

—

i.e.,

birth

and death.

For
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Bonhoeffer, however, death is disclosive of something else. He
“The Christian account [of death] is very different: in
death to which man has forfeited himself, and into which he
has always lapsed, existence finds its real end, its terminus, not
its wholeness, completion, perfection; here ‘end’ qua finish and
‘end’ qua fulfillment are identifiable only in the metaphysical
system. Death is eternal death.” ^2 por Bonhoeffer death lies
outside of the structure of human being. It is the final “not
yet” the contingency of all contingency, the negation at the end
of all negations. Death is the abyss, it is oblivion. This experience of death, precisely because it is experienced as coming
from outside of us, is experienced as the self in judgment: “[I]n
death, man must stand before the judgment-seat of Christ II
Because death is experienced as the final end
Cor. 5, 10.”
which meets the self from outside of itself, the possibility it
discloses is experienced as the self is put into question. It is
important to note that both Heidegger and Bonhoeffer make
use of the Augustinian phrase: “I have become a question to
However, because the “not yet” in Heidegger’s phimyself.”
losophy already belongs to the existence of Dasein so, finally,
does the answer to the question that the self becomes. Bonhoeffer, in his Inaugural Lecture of 1930, writes, “Heidegger
certainly fully understands the man questioning himself to be
the basic problem, but in the end, in his writings also, the
question becomes the answer, man in fact has knowledge of
himself, the question has no ultimate seriousness.” ^5 However,
for Bonhoeffer, because the self meets a finality which in no
way belongs to it, the question is experienced differently. In
Heidegger’s thought the anticipation of death throws one back
upon existence and the possibilities inherent within it. For
Bonhoeffer the anticipation of death throws the self back before existence and the question of existence becomes one of the
self’s source. Because the self anticipates the creator as judge
in death it is thrown back upon the question of this creator as
the source of its being. Or, in other words, once the self finds
itself not to be its own creator and judge through the realization that death is beyond its control that death is something
totally outside of itself the self asks the question of its relationship to the creator, source and judge of its existence. The
self is disclosed as having a primordial source from whence it
writes,

,

—

—

came.

—

|

|

!
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Given the

self’s

confrontation with death and with

autonomy comes

new

its cre-

Autonbe
creature
of
God
trying
to
independent
of
God.
the
is
omy
It is the self’s attempt at its own Godhood. Bonhoeffer states,
“As the image of God man draws his life entirely from his origin
in God, but the man who has become like God has forgotten
how he was at his origin and has made himself his own creator
In the above analysis of human autonomy it has
and judge.”
been suggested that the human individual understood as a selfator,

to be understood in a

own

light.

is the ultimate reality.
world through reason, its
identity its answer to the question: “Who are you?”
must
come from within itself. Its “being” is established and created
through its doing. The action of the autonomous self will always already be an attempt to create its own identity. This
is so because in the illusion that I am the ultimate reality my
doing will attempt to disclose the unity of my being. Death, as

constituting source of

If

the

I

is

—

its

creator of itself

existence

and

its

—

the final limit upon my self-determined doing, will continually
show my action to be futile. Because my “doing” cannot point
to a source that lies both before and after the contingency of
existence the question of my identity in “doing” will always be
fragmented. Bonhoeffer suggests that the I’s choice between
good and evil is precisely the disclosure of this fragmentation,
this disunity.

He

writes,

[A] heady in the possibility of the

knowledge of good and evil Chrisaway from the origin. .The knowledge of good and evil shows that he is no longer at one with this
origin. .[because]. .in the knowledge of good and evil man does not
tian ethics discerns a falling

.

.

.

understand himself in the reality of the destiny appointed in his
origin [i.e., his source before and after existence], hut rather in his

own

possibilities, his possibility of being

good or

evil.^'^

“Man knows good and evil, against
God, against his origin, godlessly and of his own choice, understanding himself according to his own contrary possibilities;
Bonhoeffer continues,

and he

is

cut off from the unifying reconciling

life

in

God, and

Thus, human life is in disunion.
What began as autonomy has come to be understood as sin,
or as Bonhoeffer often calls it, “being-in- Adam”.
The experience of this disunity is shame. “Shame is man’s
ineffaceable recollection of his estrangement from the origin;
it is grief for this estrangement, and the powerless longing to
is

delivered over to death.”
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return to unity with the origin.” ^0 As the “futural” subject
projects itself towards the nullity of death and is thrown back
upon its creator “it is the memory of the disunion from the
Creator, and of the robbery from the Creator”, which is disclosed in shame. 41 From the experience of shame comes the
necessity of conscience. Conscience
.is the voice of the apos.

which desires to at least remain one with itself.” 42 The
self in shame sets up God as the voice of conscience as an attempt to recover the origin that has been lost. I believe that
by establishing a right relationship to myself I can establish a
right relationship to God. The essence of conscience is that I
become my own judge because I still assume that I have the
freedom to make the right choices. I believe that by standing
in judgment between my own possibilities of good and evil I
can choose the good and thus gather myself back together and
return to my origin. I remain my own judge and the creator
tate

life

my own possibilities — even the possibility of being
to my origin. The Old Adam, the autonomous self,
of

control over

self.

However, by maintaining

restored
still

has

this control the self

between good
and evil. As judge and creator of my existence I stand alone in
judgment of myself. In other words, as one in shame employing
conscience I believe that each and every word and deed each
choice between good and evil that comes from within me will
create the totality of who I am. Therefore, as my own judge
my action and speech are paralyzed. As I bear the “Atlasburden” of judgment I cannot purposefully act because each
moment of my existence is plagued by an overwhelming indecisiveness as I stand between an infinite variety of possibilities.
In “exalting himself to be his own final judge” writes Bonhoeffer, the autonomous self “proceeds to his own indictment” .43
Conscience tells me that I must restore myself to unity with
my source. I can do this through my active choice of good and
evil. However, because I know that my existence depends on
exists forever in the conflict of its conscience

—

—

,

each decision

my

decision

I

is

am

driven to fear

my own

always not to decide.

comes an action that

is

no action

at

actions. Therefore,

Thus,
ail.

I

my

“action” be-

actively decide not

concern always to chose the good my attention
is focused on myself and my choices. Once again I am turned
back into myself (Luther) and therefore removed from life in
to act. In

sociality.

my

.
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At this point two conclusions can be reached and the ensuing problematic can be noted. First, the understanding of
human autonomy was sufficiently challenged by an appeal to
the experience of the self in community. That is, it was asserted
that reality is experienced socially and that to be at all is always to be already in a world of sociality. Thus, our “doing” is
always already within a world. While it “creates” in the sense
that others experience my action as an “unexpected” possibility, it does not constitute the world. My doing is always derivaSecondly, the understanding of
tive of “being-in-the- world”
human autonomy was sufficiently challenged by reflecting upon
the human experience of death and disunity with its source. By
showing that our “being-in-disunity” precedes our doing it can
be stated that while our “doing” is always disclosive of our
being it does not constitute it. Two relationships, and their
resultant temporalizing of existence through the “other” and
through death, stand as evidence against human autonomy.
Also, through sociality and death the relation of “doing” and
“being” has been explored. “Being-in-the-world” and “beingin-disunity” have been shown always to precede “doing”
Now that we have re-opened a space for ethical reflection
by suggesting an alternative to human autonomy another problem presents itself. Human being as “being-in-the-world” calls
one’s attention to the (horizontal) relationship with the world.
Human being as being-in-disunity-with-its-source calls one’s
attention to the (vertical) relationship with God. This presents
a challenge to ethical reflection. We began by asking whether
ethical reflection was possible given the understanding of human being as autonomous. Through an examination of that
autonomy it was concluded that it would be unnecessary for
the human being as an autonomous being to enter into ethical
reflection. This is so because ethical reflection is only necessary
and meaningful if the “other” makes some sort of a claim upon
our existence. Thus ethical life has to do with the relations between the self and the various “others” 44 that it experiences in
its world. The challenge to human autonomy through sociality certainly opens up a space for ethical reflection. However,
it does not advance the case for a specifically theological ethical reflection. The challenge to human autonomy through an
understanding of human as disunited with its source seems to
leave the human in only a vertical relationship with God. 45
.

—

84
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This leaves us with the question: Can Christian ethics be possible at all? Or, in other words, can a theological interpretation
of being mediate between the human as “being-in-the-world”

and as “being-in-disunity”?
Bonhoeffer answers this question by suggesting that all
ontological discourse must be carried on within the specifically theological categories of “being-in- Adam”

and “being-inHe writes, “The reality of sin. .places the individual
Christ”
in the utmost loneliness, in a state of radical separation from
God and man.” 47 Therefore, because disunion with the source
.

is also disunion with the “others” I experience
world,
ethical
in the
reflection must take sin into account. This
has already been suggested in the above analysis. It was stated
that the human in disunity is captured by its own conscience
and turned in upon itself to consider its own possibility of being good. The “being-in- Adam” in shameful disunity, employs
conscience and in so doing turns in upon its own possibilities
in search of the right action that will reunite it with the source
of its existence. Only through the eyes of one who is in Adam
are the world and God separated. Ironically, it is freedom the
hallmark of the autonomous self that is the reason for this.
Freedom as an innate quality of human being allows the self to
choose between good and evil and in so doing leaves the self
in paralysis. This is so because every choice is always already

of our existence

,

—

—

in

bondage

to that choice.

istence depends

upon

The autonomous

whose exby its
the world can never happen

its right choices, is

sinner,

forever stalled

very own freedom. A choice for
because it may be the wrong choice and, therefore, endanger
the self’s quest back to the creator. Thus, the futility of life is
disclosed. I am alienated from the source of my existence and
in attempting to overcome this through my freedom I am enslaved to myself and alienated from the rest of the world. The
human is left alone in a world of “things” that can be used
in an attempt to make right the fragmented relationship with
God. 48 “Being-in- Adam” is being that is separated from both

God and

world.
Bonhoeffer’s claim is that it is only in Christ that one can be
related to reality (the horizontal) and God (the vertical) at the
same time. In making this assertion Bonhoeffer opens up a new
understanding of freedom. He writes, “God in Christ is free for
man. Because he does not retain his freedom for himself the

—
,
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concept of freedom only exists for us as ‘being free for’.”^^ God
freely enters into relationship with his sinful creation and takes
upon himself the fragmentation and disunity that characterizes
the existence of his creatures. It is because God joins together
“in Christ” what human being has split apart “in Adam” that
one can live in both the vertical relationship (creature and
creator) and the horizontal relationship (creature to creature
in community). Bonhoeffer writes,
In a manner which passes all comprehension God reverses the judgment of justice and piety, declares Himself guilty towards the world,
and thereby wipes out the world’s guilt. God himself sets out on the
path of humiliation and atonement, and thereby absolves the world.
God is willing to be guilty of our guilt. He takes upon himself the
punishment and the suffering which this guilt has brought on us.
God Himself answers for godlessness, love for hatred, the saint for
the sinner. Now there is no more godlessness, no more hatred, no
more sin which God has not taken upon Himself, suffered for and
expiated. Now there is no more reality, nor more world, but it is
reconciled with God and at peace. God did this in his dear Son
Jesus Christ. Ecce homo!^^

Through the “glorious exchange” God has entered into a
new unity with the creation. The problem rested in the illusion
of the autonomous subject who believed that it was responsible
for restoring this unity through its freedom. Through the soteriological focus Bonhoeffer makes his final move to show the
freedom of the autonomous I to be bondage. The source, not
the alienated creature, is the one who must make the constiand give freedom. Because
doing lacks the power to mediate the gap between
“being-in- Adam” and “being-in-Christ” it is only God who can
put our “being-in” into a different space. Freedom as my freedom leaves me alone and in bondage to myself and my possibilities. It is only by a restored relationship with the “other”
both God and the other, that we can be put in the space or
relationship of freedom. This means that freedom-in- Adam
the freedom of the noumenal self alone with itself is simply
an illusion. And, given what has been said about conscience,
this illusive freedom is disclosed in the end as bondage.
Now, “being-in-Christ” means always seeing the world and
God as mediated by the creative redemption of Christ. And
now, because of this, Christian ethics is a reality. Bonhoeffer
tutive change at the level of being
all

human

—

writes.
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No man can

he may, he can only
the other.

God and at the world
the world are torn asunder. Try as

look with undivided vision at

of reality so long as

But there

God and

eyes wander distractedly from one to
a place at which God and the cosmos are

let his
is

which God and man have become one. That
and that alone is what enables man to set his eyes upon God and
upon the world at the same time. [This place] lies in Jesus Christ,
the Reconciler of the world. .Whoever sees Jesus Christ does indeed
see God and the world in one. He can henceforward no longer see
God without the world or the world without God.^^
reconciled, a place at

.

Because through Christ God is always already seen with the
world and the world is seen with God, the purpose of Christian
ethics is “participation in the reality of God and of the world
in Jesus Christ today, and this participation must be such that
I never experience the reality of God without the reality of the
world or the reality of the world without the reality of God.”^^
Human being as “being-in-Christ” is always already an ethical being. This is so because the activity of God in Christ has
re-located us into a space of relationships. We are in relationship with others because we are in relationship with God, the
source, judge and reconciler of our existence. No longer can
Christian theology retreat into a one-sided vertical relationis
ship with the divine. Freedom as it is given us in Christ
always freedom for the “other” Human being is free “only by
means of the Word of God [i.e., Jesus the Reconciler] .. .Freedom
it is not a possession, a
is not a quality which can be revealed
presence, an object. .but a relationship and nothing else. .Being

—

—
.

—

.

means

.

Therefore, Christian
existence is existence located in freedom and is therefore related, ethical existence. Because of this a Christian ethic is
free

‘being free for the other’.”

both possible and necessary.
Is it meaningful to speak about existence as ethical at all?
The conclusion is that it is. Ethical reflection understood temporally and theologically is necessary and meaningful because
we are located by God through Christ within a community of
brothers and sisters. Within this community we are made “free
for” each other because in Christ we were made “free from”
ourselves. The illusion of the autonomous human individual
who is alone and self-constituting presents a challenge that
Bonhoeffer’s theological understanding has been able to overcome. The groundwork has been accomplished and the task of
ethical reflection within the Body of Christ can begin.
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